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The Problem of Unintelligibility in OT Semantics 
Helen de Hoop 
University of Leiden 
When does an utterance make sense?1 In order to be able to answer this question it might be 
helpful to study utterances that do not make sense. Surely, there are many different types of 
utterances that do not make sense. In this squib I will examine one particular type, namely 
when a syntactically well-formed expression does not obtain a felicitous interpretation. I will 
call this the problem of unintelligibility, the natural counterpart of the problem of ineffability, 
well-known in Optimality Theory. 
1. Ineffability 
Ineffability refers to the problem when a semantic input does not yield a well-formed syntac-
tic expression as its output. It is considered a problem since in Optimality Theory (henceforth, 
OT), each input should give rise to at least one optimal output (Prince and Smolensky 1993, 
1997). 
Crucially, in OT, an output can never be rejected because the constraints it violates are 
too numerous or too strong. An output can be rejected for one reason only: there is a better 
alternative in the set of possible outputs. Given the theorem of Harmony maximization 
(Smolensky 1986), each input is assigned an output with maximal Harmony and this output 
can be considered the optimal parse according to the relevant set of constraints. When there-
fore an input does not give rise to an optimal output, this is a problem either for the theory in 
general, or for the particular analysis of the input-output mapping under consideration. An 
example of an input that does not yield a grammatical output can be found in Jelinek (1993). 
She refers to the excluded sentence type (Id) in Lumrni (a Straits Salish language) as a "para-
digm gap": 
(1) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
xci-t-or|8s=s8n 
xci-t-0=sen 
xci-t-s=0 
* 
xci-t-rpsen 
'I know you.' 
'I know him.' 
'He knows him.' 
'He knows me.' 
'I am known.' 
NOM ACC 
NOM ABS 
ERG ABS 
*ERG ABS 
NOM 
There is no transitive sentence corresponding to (Id) where a third person agent bearing erga-
tive case acts upon a first person patient marked with absolutive case. Thus, there is no syn-
tactically well-formed output corresponding to an input meaning 'He knows me' in this lan-
guage. Instead, a passive construction such as in (le) can be employed. 
Clearly, the problem of ineffability as illustrated by the paradigm in (1) is a problem 
for the general theory of OT which predicts each input to be assigned an output after evalua-
11 presented this squib at the conference Making Sense that was organized in November 2000 in Groningen, the 
Netherlands, in honour of Werner Abraham on the occasion of his retirement. The squib was written when I was 
a visiting professor at the university of Potsdam, Germany, October - December 2000.1 would like to thank the 
Interdisciplinary Center for Cognitive Science and the General Linguistics Department in Potsdam for inviting 
me, and for creating such a pleasant and stimulating atmosphere. I greatly benefited from Reinhard Blutner's 
insightful comments on an earlier version of this squib. 
187 
tion against a ranked set of constraints. The problem only arises, however, in the context of a 
limited set of candidate outputs. Once one allows for the passive construction in (le) to be-
come part of the candidate set of syntactic outputs, there would be an optimal output for (Id), 
namely (le). More in general, one could argue that any semantic object a speaker at a certain 
time in a given discourse would want to express, should find an optimal output of some kind, 
which in a rather extreme case may even be a non-linguistic one. 
2. Unintelligibility 
The topic of this squib is the problem of unintelligibility, which may be viewed as the natural 
counterpart of ineffability within OT semantics. Whereas in OT syntax the process of optimi-
zation maps a semantic input onto its optimal syntactic structure, in OT semantics, a syntactic 
input is assigned an optimal interpretation (see Hendriks and De Hoop 1997, to appear, for a 
first elaboration of this approach). The problem arises when there does not seem to be an op-
timal interpretation in the candidate set of interpretation outputs for a certain input. Of course, 
like the problem of ineffability, briefly discussed above, whether the problem of unintelligi-
bility is considered to be a real problem for the theory, highly depends on whether or not one 
wishes to restrict the candidate set of outputs. I will argue in this paper that the problem of 
unintelligibility is partly solved when one allows for an infelicitous interpretation to be the 
optimal one for a certain syntactic input. 
In the following example, every German can be interpreted as every German who 
owns a car, the presupposition triggered by the object his car (cf. Geurts and Van der Sandt 
1999): 
(2) Every German is proud of his car. 
However, as Beaver (1994) notes, every team member in (3) cannot be interpreted as every 
team member who owns a car, despite the fact that an object his car is present that should 
trigger the presupposition, as was possible in (2).2 
(3) #Few of the team members can drive, but every team member will come to the 
match in his car. 
Geurts and Van der Sandt (1999) argue that the second determiner every preferably lives on 
the whole set of team members instead of on the set of team members that can drive. This 
would give rise to the infelicitous interpretation, since how can people come to the match in 
their (own) cars if they cannot drive? I think that Geurts and Van der Sandt are correct in that 
this is indeed the infelicitous interpretation obtained for sentence (3). The question remains to 
be answered why this interpretation is the only possible one. Or, why does (3) not allow for a 
reading as the one that is naturally assigned to the utterance in (4): 
2
 Blutner (to appear) argues that sentence (4) actually indicates that the interpretation given for (3) is not the 
right one and that the right interpretation would be „Every German has a car and is proud of it" instead of „Eve-
ry German who has a car is proud of it." Blutner claims that this explains the infelicity of (4), since that should 
be interpreted as .Jew of the team members can drive, but every team member has a car and will come to the 
match in his car." I do not think Blutner's judgements can be maintained, however. I would claim, in accordan-
ce with Geurts and Van der Sandt, that „Every German is proud of his children" means „Every German who has 
children is proud of them" rather than „Every German has children and is proud of them." 
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(4) Few of the team members can drive, but every team member that can will come 
to the match in his car. 
As far as I understand their analysis correctly, Geurts and Van der Sandt do not provide a sat-
isfactory answer to that question. They point out that in (3) the hearer must identify a suitable 
set of team members. There are two sets available in the linguistic context, the whole set of 
team members and the set of team members that can drive, and they note that "the hearer will 
decide to bind the presupposition triggered by every team member" to the first set, the set of 
all team members. But they do not explain why the hearer decides to do so. 
Unlike suggested by the account of Geurts and Van der Sandt, it is not in general the 
case that a second determiner in a discourse quantifies over the same set as the first determiner 
(set A) rather than over the intersection of the sets related by the first determiner (AnB). In 
Hendriks and De Hoop (to appear) two conflicting constraints are formulated that account for 
the interpretations obtained in (5) in (6) (cf. Nerbonne, Iida & Ladusaw 1990): 
(5) Most students attended the meeting. Some spoke. 
(6) Most deliveries were on time. Some weren't. 
In (5) the preferred domain of quantification for the second determiner, some, is the set of 
students that attended the meeting (that is, the intersection of the sets A and B related by the 
first determiner, most. In (6), however, the domain of quantification for the second deter-
miner, some, is not the set of deliveries that were on time, but the whole set of deliveries (set 
A of the first determiner, most). Intuitively, it is clear why. If some were to quantify over the 
set of deliveries that were on time, we would get a contradictory interpretation, viz. that some 
deliveries that were on time weren't on time. In Hendriks and De Hoop (to appear) the con-
trast between the preferred readings of (5) and (6) is explained with the help of four conflict-
ing constraints, viz., Avoid Contradiction, Topicality, Forward Directionality, and Parallelism: 
(7) Avoid Contradiction. 
(8) Topicality: As the antecedent of an anaphoric expression, choose a 
topic. 
(9) Forward Directionality: The original topic range induced by the domain 
of quantification of a determiner is reduced to the topic range induced by 
the intersection of the two argument sets ofthat determiner. 
(10) Parallelism: As the antecedent of an anaphoric expression, choose a 
parallel element from the preceding clause. 
Forward Directionality (adapted from a notion of Van Kuppevelt 1996) favours the intepreta-
tion obtained in (5). In (6) Forward Directionality is violated. On the other hand, Avoid Con-
tradiction and Parallelism favour the interpretation that is obtained in (6). As the reader may 
verify, the ranking in (11) accounts for these interpretations: 
(11) Avoid Contradiction » Topicality » Forward Directionality » 
Parallelism 
This ranking also predicts the right interpretations for the following examples (boldface is 
mine): 
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(12) These Thracians are peasants. They fight two or three times a year, in 
a cattleraid or a brawl. Most of them are stupid, none of them are 
trained. 
{Fire from heaven by Mary Renault, 1984, p. 150) 
(13) At the town gates, horses and helpers were waiting by arrangement, and 
Pausanias seemed certain to escape. Only a few strides more and he 
would have been among them, but he overreached in his haste to jump 
astride; tripping, he fell, for his boot had caught in the trailing stem of a 
vine. At once three of his pursuers were on him, all of them highland 
nobles, one from his own kingdom. But familiarity meant nothing and 
they killed him, some said then and there; others claimed more plausi-
bly that they dragged him back to the theatre where he could be ques-
tioned for accomplices and then comdemned to death. 
{Alexander the Great by Robin Lane Fox, 1973, p.21) 
In (12) these Thracians is the topic of the discourse. The pronoun they is anaphorically re-
lated to this topic and so are the two instances of them. Therefore, Topicality is satisfied when 
the determiners most and none are both interpreted as quantifiers over the topic set. In (13) the 
determiner three relates the set of pursuers and the set of individuals being "on him". The 
intersection of these two sets functions as the domain of quantification of all, in accordance 
with Forward Directionality. Thus, Parallelism is violated in order to satisfy the higher ranked 
constraint Forward Directionality, which accounts for the fact that the topic range is narrowed 
from the set of pursuers to the set of pursuers that were on him. The next determiner one takes 
again the intersection of the sets related by the previous determiner, in this case the set of pur-
suers that were on him that were highland nobles. Here of course, since all of the pursuers that 
were on him were highland nobles, we cannot distinguish the interpretation that is obtained 
when Forward Directionality is satisfied, from the interpretation that is obtained when Paral-
lelism is satisfied. In the next sentence, they, because it is plural, cannot refer to the one high-
land noble from his own kingdom, and therefore it has to refer to the domain of quantification 
of one, once again the set of pursuers that were on him. They killed Pausanias and of course, 
they should know when and where they did it. Therefore, the next quantifier some cannot 
quantify over this set of killers, as it would yield some kind of incoherent (not really contra-
dictory, though) interpretation. The reader has to determine the domain of quantification of 
some herself, so let's take it to be the set of Alexander's historians. Now, others inherently 
cannot quantify over the historians that "said then and there" (i.e., others by definition ex-
cludes coreference with respect to some). Apart from that, quantifying over the historians that 
"said then and there" would involve a violation of Avoid Contradiction. That is, Forward Di-
rectionality has to be violated in order to satisfy Avoid Contradiction. And by this necessary 
violation of Forward Directionality, we witness the emergence of a parallel interpretation, in 
accordance with the weaker constraint Parallelism. The optimal interpretation that satisfies 
Avoid Contradiction and Parallelism is obtained when the domain of quantification of others 
is the same as that of some, i.e., the set of Alexander's historians. For reasons of space, I do 
not provide the relevant tableaux. The reader is kindly invited to evaluate the candidate inter-
pretations against the constraint ranking given above. 
At this point, consider the intepretations that result from replacing one or all of the 
anaphors in the fragment above by fully descriptive nominal constituents. 
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(14) a. At once three of his pursuers were on him, all of his pursuers high-
land nobles, one from his own kingdom. But familiarity meant nothing 
and they killed him,... 
b. At once three of his pursuers were on him, all of them highland no-
bles, one from his own kingdom. But familiarity meant nothing and his 
pursuers killed him,... 
c. At once three of his pursuers were on him, all of his pursuers high-
land nobles, one of his pursuers from his own kingdom. But familiar-
ity meant nothing and his pursuers killed him,... 
Clearly, when a full descriptive noun phrase in (14a) is used, the resulting interpretation no 
longer satisfies Forward Directionality. Instead of going from A to (AnB) (from the set of 
pursuers to the set of pursuers that were on him), it seems as if the use of a full expression has 
the effect of going from (AnB) to the superset A (the whole set of pursuers) again. In the 
original fragment (13) that contained an anaphor, all was interpreted as quantifying over the 
set of pursuers that were on him. In the optimal interpretation of (14a), all quantifies over the 
whole set of pursuers, thus violating Forward Directionality. This has consequences for the 
rest of the discourse. Now, they also refers to the whole set of pursuers (who all happen to be 
highland nobles) and not to the restricted set of pursuers that were on him. In (14b) by the use 
of the full noun phrase his pursuers we get the interpretation that the killing was done by his 
pursuers, not necessarily by the restricted set of pursuers that were on him and that were 
highland nobles. In (14c), the lack of anaphoric expressions renders the fragment unnecessar-
ily explicit and artificial, but the interpretation we get is that every predicate is evaluated with 
respect to the whole set of his pursuers and never to a subset. 
Recall Beaver's problematic (unintelligible) example in (3) above. In (3), too, Forward 
Directionality seems to be violated. That is, the second determiner, every, cannot anaphori-
cally pick up the intersection of the two argument sets related by the first determiner, few. 
Why not? I claim that the solution to this problem is in the explicit use of the NP team mem-
ber. If an anaphor would have been used instead, Forward Directionality could have been sat-
isfied, as in (15) 
(15) Few of the team members can drive, but every one of those will come to 
the match in his car. 
In the next section I will provide an analysis of the problem of unintelligibility along these 
lines. 
3. Towards solving the problem 
One way to account for the infelicity of (3) above would be to have an additional well-known 
pragmatic constraint like Be informative to be ranked above Avoid Contradiction in our pre-
vious ranking: 
(16) Be Informative: a. Don't say less than necessary; 
b. Don't say more than necessary. 
If we consider the two relevant interpretations for (3), one where every quantifies over the set 
of team members and another one where it quantifies over the set of team members who can 
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drive, then we may argue that the first interpretation violates Avoid Contradiction and For-
ward Directionality. It is still the optimal interpretation, however (hence, the only interpreta-
tion that we get), since it satisfies the higher ranked constraint Be Informative (the use of the 
full NP is necessary to get the superset interpretation again, as was showed in (14)). The other 
interpretation would be a violation of Be Informative. In fact, it violates either (16a) or (16b). 
One way to obtain the subset interpretation is by using an anaphor as was shown in (15). In 
that sense, the use of a full NP as in (3) would be a violation of (16b). There is another way to 
get the desired subset interpretation, and that is by making that reading fully explicit in a 
complex noun phrase, as was done in (4) above. Then the mere use of the NP team member 
would violate (16a). So, the expression every team member in (3) is either too much (violating 
(16b)) or too little (violating (16a)) for the intended interpretation every team member that can 
drive. Since there is an alternative interpretation around that does not violate Be Informative 
in one way or another, this is the optimal interpretation we get for (3). Yet, the optimal inter-
pretation is a contradictory interpretation (few of the team members can drive, but the whole 
set of team members will come to the match in their cars), one that satisfies Be Informative 
yet violates Avoid Contradiction, as shown in the tableau in (17): 
(17) A is the set of team members; AnB is the set of team members that can 
drive. 
Input 
every &" 
team member 
Output 
{X: AcX} 
{X: AnBcX} 
Be informa-
tive 
* 
Avoid Con-
tradiction 
* 
Forward Di-
rectionality 
* 
Parallelism 
* 
In fact, it is not surprising that more or less contradictory interpretations can be optimal, since 
we do get these interpretations every now and then. Consider for example (18): 
(18) Most female professors are men with beards or glasses. 
The only, hence optimal, yet contradictory, interpretation we get for (18) is that the number of 
female professors who are men with beards or glasses exceeds the number of female profes-
sors who are not men with beards or glasses. 
Note, however, that intuitively there is a crucial difference between (18) and (3). In 
(18) the problem of unintelligibility does not seem to arise. That is, although the interpretation 
one gets in (18) is weird and contradictory, it is certainly the one and only interpretation, 
hence the optimal one, and we get it without any problems. Instead, in (3) we encountered the 
problem of unintelligibility, the feeling that no optimal interpretation can be assigned, not 
even a straightforwardly weird one. In the remainder of this squib, I will put forward a sug-
gestion how to deal with this intuitive difference in optimality between (18) and (3). 
In the explanation proposed above for the oddness of (3) the hearer finds the optimal 
interpretation by evaluating the candidate interpretations with respect to Be Informative. Ob-
viously, Be Informative is a constraint that must have played a role in generating the optimal 
form (the speaker's perspective). Blutner's (to appear) framework goes one step further and 
takes the effects of the interaction of the speaker's and the hearer's perspective to a higher 
level of abstraction. Blutner integrates optimal interpretation and optimal production in a bi-
drectional OT. Within this approach, the notion of super-optimality is defined. Super-optimal 
pairs of meanings and forms are optimal in both directions of optimization. 
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Blutner distinguishes between a strong and a weak version of bidirectional OT. In the 
strong version, a form-meaning pair <A,T> is super-optimal if and only if there is no pair 
<A' ,T> or <A,T '> such that <A ' ,T> or <A,T '> is more harmonic or more economical than 
<A,T>. Hence, super-optimal pairs are those that are both optimal when the production per-
spective is taken and optimal when the comprehension perspective is taken. Strong bidirec-
tional OT is strong in the sense that the two directions of optimization are independent of each 
other. A pair is super-optimal just in case the meaning is the optimal meaning for the form and 
the form is the optimal form for the meaning. Strong bidirectionality accounts for total 
blocking, but not for partial blocking. The general tendency associated with partial blocking 
seems to be the pragmatic generalization that marked forms tend to be used for marked inter-
pretations. This is accounted for by Blutner's weak version of bidirectional OT. In weak bidi-
rectional OT, the structures that compete in one perspective of optimization are constrained by 
the outcomes of the other perspective and vice versa. In the weak version, not only <A,T> is 
super-optimal, but also <A ' ,T '> . That is, the form-meaning pair that consists of an unmarked 
form and an unmarked meaning is strongly super-optimal (in the strong version of bidirec-
tional OT it is the only super-optimal pair). But the form-meaning pair that consists of a 
marked form and a marked meaning is also super-optimal, albeit in a weaker sense (it is only 
super-optimal in a weak version of bidirectionality). In our example (3), we obtain a marked 
(infelicitous) interpretation for a marked (non-anaphoric) form, hence a weakly super-optimal 
pair. 
Crucially, it is in this respect that the optimal weird interpretation in (3) might differ 
from the optimal weird interpretation we get in (18). The optimal interpretation that we get for 
(3) is part of a weakly super-optimal pair. There is an alternative strongly super-optimal pair, 
consisting of an unmarked form and an unmarked interpretation, the one we encounter in (15). 
Of course, this strongly super-optimal pair is not a true alternative for the weakly super-
optimal one, since optimization takes place in one direction only. The unmarked form would 
not yield the marked interpretation and the marked interpretation would not arise for the un-
marked form. In (18), however, although the interpretation we get is contradictory, it is part of 
a strongly super-optimal pair. This suggests that unintelligibility only arises when inconsistent 
meanings are part of weakly super-optimal form-meaning pairs. 
4. Conclusion 
I hope to have shown in this squib that the problem of unintelligibility in OT is not a real 
problem for the theory, once we recognize that sometimes infelicitous interpretations might be 
optimal and hence should be part of the candidate set of interpretations. Unintelligibility is 
more than optimal infelicity, however. That is, unintelligibility arises when infelicitous 
meanings are part of optimal form-meaning pairs that are only weakly super-optimal in the 
sense of Blutner (to appear). 
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